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TAYLOR V. MURPHY.

SYLLABUS.
Mechanics' Liens-Right ofSib-ContradortofileLiet.-Thedecision
in Shroeder v. Galland, 134 Pa., 277, that where the contractor has stipulated that no lien shall be filed, the sub-contractor is bound by the stipulation and has no right of lien, approved. Such an agreement violates
no rule of public policy. A statute that should disregard its obligation
and authorize the entry of a lien for work or materials in violation of its
terms would seem to be within the prohibition of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, Art. x, 17, which declares that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. It might also be within the limitation on the powers of the several States, found in ArL i, io, of the Constitution of the United States.
But there is no waiver of the right to enter a lien or covenant that
none shall be entered, where the contractor has merely agreed "to release and discharge the said houses from the operation of all liens, either
for materials furnished, or work done in the construction of the same."
It is no defence against the lien of a sub-contractor that the building
was erected under a written contract, in which the contractor was bound
to provide all materials and labor and complete the building, for a fixed
sum, to be paid when the building was finished; and that he did not
finish it.
A sub-contractor or material-man is entitled to a lien for what his
materials or labor are reasonably worth, although the aggregate of the
liens against the building is greater than the contract price.
A general allegation in an affidavit of defence in a suit on a mechanics' lien, that the materials for which the lien is filed-were not such as
the contract required, is insufficient.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A sci. fa. having been issued on the lien filed by the
plaintiffs, who had furnished materials for the house in
question upon the order of the contractor, the owner filed
an affidavit of defence, which the Court below held insufficient and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant
appealed, specifying for error this action of the Court.
The other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.'
1 Reported in 30 Weekly Notes, 27; 1 Adv. Rep., 54o.
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WILLIAMS, J., April I, I89 2.-The plaintiff furnished
lumber and manufactured woodwork, for the erection of
defendant's dwelling-house, on the order or direction of
Christy, the contractor. The mechanic's lien, on which
the writ of scirefadasin this case is issued, was entered for
the amount of material so furnished. The defendant interposed an affidavit of defence, in which several reasons;
were urged as sufficient to prevent the entry of a judgment
and carry the case to ajury for trial. These may be stated
as follows:

(I) That the house was erected under a written contract,.
in which Christy was bound to provide all material and
labor, and complete the house, for the sum of $3,750, to
be paid when the building was finished; that he did- not
finish it, and for that reason nothing was due to him or
to a sub-contractor under him.
(?) That the aggregate amount of the liens entered.
against the building, together with the cost of completing
it, would exceed the contract price, and that the liens, if
sustained, should abate proportionably, in order to bring
the total cost down to the contract price.
(3)That no liens could be entered, under the express.
stipulations of the contract with Christy, the builder.
(4)That the material furnished was not such as the
contract required, and, in consequence of its defective
character, the house was worth $125 less than it otherwise
would have been, for which sum, at least, there was a good
defence.
It is urged that the principle announced in Schroeder
v. Galland' is broad enough to cover all the propositions
contained in the affidavit, and makes a reversal of the
judgment entered in the Court below necessary. In
Weaver v. Sheeler,2 we held that all persons furnishing labor or materials for the erection of a building
were bound to take notice of the title of the apparent
owner. If he was an iitruder without right, the lien of
'1x34Pa.,

277.

2J18

Pa., 634.
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contractor and sub-contractor must alike fall. If he held an
equitable title only,. the lien would bind such title as he
had, and no more. In Schroeder v. Galland, we went a
step further, and held that, where the contractor had stipulated that no lien should be filed, he could not confer a
right upon his sub-contractor that he did not possess. The
contract between the owner and the contractor is the
source from which the right of the sub-contractor is derived
under the provisions of the law, and it is self-evident that
a stream cannot rise higher than its source. The agreement of the builder, to provide all the labor and materials
for the erection of a building, and look for his security
solely to the personal responsibility of the owner, leaving
the building unincumbered by liens, is a valid and binding
one. It violates no rule of public policy. A statute that
should disregard its obligation, and authorize the entry of
a lien for work or materials, in violation of its terms, would
seem to be within the prohibition of the Constitution, Art.
i, section 17, which declares that no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed. It might also *be
within the limitation on the powers of the several. States,
found in Art. i, section io, of the Constitution of the
United States. We are thorougtily satisfied, therefore,
with Schroeder v. Galland, and our only inquiry is,
whether this case falls within the rule there laid down.'
The third ground of defence, stated in the affidavit,
puts the case in the precise condition of Schroeder v.
Galland; but, on turning to the clause in the contract relied on to raise the question, it will be seen that it is insufficient. It contains the express promise of the contractor, " to release and discharge the said houses from the
operation of all liens, either for materials furnished, or
work done in the construction of the same." This is not
a waiver of the right to enter alien, or a covenant that none
shall be entered. It is merely a promise to release and*"
discharge "such liens aq may be entered, prior to the day
when payment in full shall be made to the contractor." He
cannot demand the payment of the balance due upon his
contract until lie has performed the undertaking to release
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and discharge the liens that may have been entered against
the building. This does not fall within the rule invoked.
Neither do the first and second grounds of the defence.
It would be unreasonable to require one who was called
on to furnish material for the foundation or walls of a
house, to anticipate the cost of all the materials to be
furnished by-others, and of all the labor to be done, in
order to the full completion of the structure. He can
know, and he must take notice, as we have seen, of the
title of the apparent owner, and of the general characterof
the agreement under which the contractor is proceeding to
build. He can know, and must take notice of the general
character of the building, and of the materials and labor
proper to be used in its construction. He must see to it
that the materials he supplies are such as may be reasonably needed for, and used about, such a building, both as to
their quantity and quality; but here his responsibility ends.
Subject to these qualifications and conditions he may bind
the building for what his materials or labor may be reasonably worth.
This brings us to the last position taken by the defendant, viz., that he is entitled to set off the sum of $125
upon the plaintifPs demand, for the reason that the materials were not such as the contract required. The only
provision in the contract on which this averment can rest,
is that which follows: "The construction, workmanship
and materials furnished are to be similar to that used and
performed in conitruction of house No. 139 Lafayette Street,
Germantown." The materials furnished by the plaintiff
included doors, sash, shutters and ornamental woodwork,
as well as flooring, shingles, joists and other rough lumber,
amounting in the aggregate to nearly $9oo. If the affidavit
had alleged a deficiency in the quality of the doors, or any
other portion of the materials furnished, as compared with
similar materials used in No. "139 Lafayette Street, a
different question would have been raised. As it is, the
allegation of a deficiency in quality relates to the materials generally, 'and the extent of the deficiency is measured,
not by a difference in the value of the articles furnished as
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compared with those contracted for, but by an alleged
difference in the value of the house as a whole, on account
of defectiveness in thematerial generally. The Court below
was right in treating this averment as altogether too
general.
Judgment affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS.
The Penna. Act of June i6th,
1836, P. L., 696; Purdon, 1157,
enacts that "every building erected
.... shall be subject to a lien for
the payment of all debts contracted
for work done, or materials 'furnished for or about the erection or
construction of the same." "Every
person entitled to such lien shall
file a claim or statement of his demand, in the office of the prothonotary of the court of common pleas
of the county in which the building
may be situate;" which claim must
set forth, inter alia, "the names of
the party claimant and of the owner
or reputed owner of the building,
and also of the contractor, architect
or builder, where the contract of the
claimant was made with such contractor, architect or builder;" also,
"the amount or sum claimed to be
due, and the nature or kind of the
work done, or the kind and amount
of materials furnished, and the time
when the materials were furnished,
or the work was done, as the case
may be." There is no provision
for the filing or recording of the
contract between the owner and the
general contractor; nor any'statement that the claims of the material-man or sub-contractor shall in
any way be subject to the terms of
the contract between the owner
and the general contractor.
Probably in consequence of the
decision in Haley v. Prosser, 8

W. & S., 134, that a special agreement under all circumstances deprives the party of his lien, and
that it is only when there is no
agreement in which the terms of
the bargain are particularly stated
that the mechanic is supposed to
c6ntract on the basis of the law and
rely upon the lien for his security,
the Act of April 16th, 1845, P. L.,
538, Purdon, page iI6o, pl. i9, was
passed, which eracts as follows:
"It is hereby declared that the
provisions ofthe Act approved June
I6th, 1836, entitled 'an Actrelating
to the lien of mechanics and others
upon .buildiugs' according to the
true intent and meaning thereof,
extend to and embrace claims for
labor done and materials furnished
and used in erecting any house or
other building, which may have
been or shall be erected under or
in pursuance of any contract or
agreement for the erection of the
same, and the provisions of the said
Act shall be so construed; and no
claim, which has been or may be
filed against any house or other
building or the lien thereof, or any
proceedings thereon shall be in any
manner affected by reason of any
contract having been entered into
for the erection of such building,
but the same shall be held hs good
and valid as if the building had
not been erected by contract."
In Young v. Lyman in 9 Pa. St.,
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449, decided in 1848, Young filed a
lien against Lyman for work done
under a written contract for the
erection of certain houses, in which
contract there was a clause as follows: "All materials to be paid
for four months after the completion of the job, and Young to
give security in $5oo that no lien
shall be entered on the houses ;"
which stipulation the Court ruled
to be "that no other person or
sub-contractor shall file a lien,"
and that Young was therefore entitled to his lien. In i88o, in the
case of Long v. Caffery, 93 Pa. St.,
526, Long expressly stipulated
"that no mechanic's or other lien
shall be entered against said building by the said Long or the material
The
contractor or workmen."
court decided that Long had waived
his right of lien, and that this
agreement on his part was not dependent upon a covenant by the
owner to insure the building and
a-sign the policy of insurance to
Long as collateral security. In
i888 the ease of Scheid v. Rapp,
121 Pa. St., 593, came before the
Court. Here the contract contained the following provision:
"And the said Dionis Rapp hereby
for himself, his heirs, executors
and administrators (covenants) that
he will not suffer or permit 'tobe
filed in the Court of Common
Pleas of Lancaster County any
mechanics' lien or liens against
the said building for the period of
six months after its completion."
It was argued that under the decision of Young v. Lyman, supra,
Rapp had not waived his right of
lien ; but the Supreme Court held
that he had, saying: "The sole
question is whether the contractor
by his covenant waived the right to
file, or authorize a lien to be filed,

in his own favor. We think he
did. While the phraseology of the
stipulation is different from that
of Long v. Caffery, 93 Pa., 526, the
legal effect of both is the same.
The lien under consideration was
necessarily filed by the plaintift
below, himself, or by his sufferance
or permission. In either case, it
was as clearly a violation of his
covenant as if he had suffered or
permitted any mechanic or material-man to file a lien." Young v.
Lyman was not cited by the Court,
but may be considered to have been
overruled by this decision.
The case of Campbell v. Schaife
was decided by the District Court
of Allegheny County, in I85r, and
is reported in I Phila., 187. In this
case a lien was filed by sub-contractors, andthe owners filed, interalia,
a plea "That the debt claim ought
not to be levied on said house, because the plaintiffs were sub-contractors under one James Millinger
(impleaded with the owners), who
had undertaken to erect said house
for the owners, and to furnish materials, and to receive payment
therefor partly in merchandise and
piartly in money, in one, two and
three years after the completion of
the building; concluding with an
averment of readiness, verification
and prayer forjudgment, etc." The
Court decided that this plea was
vicious in not stating specifically
the amounts to be paid in goods and
money respectively, and the kind
of goods and times of payment;
and that it was a plea in bar and
not in suspension of the remedy;
that it should have been a plea in
abatement, postponing the right to
a sci.fa. on the lien; the Court saying: "The best position in which
the owners of the building can ask
to be placed, is to consider them as
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having made the contract themselves with the sub-contractor, as
to the time and mode of payment.
Surely the lien law is broad enough
in its terms to allow alien even with
a stipulated mode ofpayment. The
lien law then stands as security for
the payment in this mode: aud not
until a failure thus to pay, does the
party acquire a right to the remedy
by sci.fa., and then he may claim
a judgment for the payment in
money.- . . . Even on a lien,
payable by instalments, part of
which may not .be due, I see no
great difficulty in framing the pleadings, verdict, andjudgment in such
a manner that the contract shall be
enforced according to its terms.
Nor does the difficulty seem .insurmountable where part o. the suspended payments are to be made in
goods." LOwarn, J., further said,
that as the informality of the plea
might readily be amended, and the
counsel had-discussed the question
which would have to be decided if
it were a plea in abatement, he
would take up that question: "Are
sub-contractors in the &ection of a
house affected, as to the time and
mode of payment, by the contract
made between the owners and the
builder?
"The law creates a lien for all
debts contracted for work done and
materials furnished for the erection of the house; and this phraseology proves that this lien, like all
analogous liens, is founded on contract express or implied. And here,
contrary to the rule as to other liens, the law, in another clause,
gives a lien even iV favor of a subcontractor. On what principle is it
founded?
"It must be on contract with the
owner, either directly or indirectly;
for it is only thus that one man can

acquire a claim upon theproperty of another. And in this way
the connection is plain. The owner
contracts with 4t builder to erect a
house on certain terms, and the
builder makes a sub-contract with
a material-man to supply the materials. The claim of relationship
consists of but two links, the second
of which hangs by the first, and will
bear no greater weight The subcontractor comes in by reason of his
direct contract relation to thebuilder, and the right of lien of the
former for his claim, is, fatensto,
substitutionary to that of the latter.
As against the owner, the terms of
the principal contract, and, as
against the builder, the terms of
the sub-contract, limit and qualify
the lien of the sub-contractor, so as
topreventhis claim fromabatingthe
terms of either contract. And it is
-because the lien of the sub-contractor is by way of abrogation to the
right of the builder, that the latter
is made a party to the proceeding.
"The justice of this limitation of
the iight of the sub-contractor is
very plain; for, if it were otherwise,
no man could ever build a house
with any certainty as to the cost of
it, unlesshe employed all the workmen, and purchased all the materials himself. He might find it built
of an entirely different character
from that contracted for, and yet
have to pay the sub-contractor,
though the builder could have no
claim upon him. He might contract for a house at $i,oo and find
liens established against it for
$2,OO.

"If such were the case, no prudent man would make a contract to
have a house erected, except with a
builder who had ample means to
secure him against liens, and such
men only could obtain the most de-
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sirable contracts. The allowance
of any lien at all to a sub-contractor
is a special privilege, granted only
in case of buildings; and it is not
unreasonable to require him to look
to the principal contract, to ascertain whether it is such as to justify
him in becoming a contractor under
it.
"The argument that the law and
the principal contract make the
builder the agent of the owner,
proves nothing. Suppose the fact
to be so; still his agency is only
special, limited by the terms of the
contract. He is to employ men to
build the house in the manner and
on the terms there indicated. For
anything beyond that he exceeds
his authority and does not bind his
principal. If, under a contract to
build a brick dwelling-house, he
erects a wooden stable, I do not
see how he or his sub-contractor
can claim any lien. Yet the latter
could do so, if the sub-contract were
not dependent on the principal one.
"To construe the law as is contended for by the plaintiffs, would
be to place the owner in the relation of a protector to allthose who
contribute to the erection of the
house. But the law treats every
man as capable of taking care of
himself. It constitutes no relation
of protection or dependence among
men who have arrived at legal discretion. It looks only to their contract relations, and adapts its remedies to the enforcement of these ;
and, if necessary for this end, it
takes hold of the debtor's effects in
the hands of other persons.
In
cases like the present it does more;
for it gives a contingent lien on
those effects in advance of their
being earned."
This case was not cited, it is believed, ii, any opinion of the Su-
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preme Court until i8go, in the case
of Schroeder v. Galland, hereafter
referred to. In Mr. Miller's edition
of Sergeant's Mechanics' Lien Law,
page 75, the decision is spoken of
in this way: "If this decision be the
law, it establishes a most important
doctrine. Every person employed
by a contractor is presumed to have
seen his contract, and as against the
owner and his house, his claim
cannot rise beyond it, or depart from
its terms. We believe, however,
that this decision is not regarded in
practice or usage."
In the case of Odd Fellows' Hall
v. Masser, 24 Pa. St., 507 (1855),
the Court laid down inter alia the
following propositions:
(i) "That where materials for the
construction of a building, contracted for in good faith, are delivered to the contractor for the building, a lien for the price of the materials may be filed against the
building, although the materials
were not used in the construction,
nor were of the right quality for a
specific use, if that fact was unknown to the seller, and they were
of such a character as to justify
their use in the construction generally.
(2) "That where the materials
furnished are of the kind that would
induce a careful, prudent and skilful man, acquainted with the building, to believe that they could be
used in its erection, and if they
could in fact be usefully employed
in its construction, then the material-man is not bound to inquire
into the character of the materials
which the contractor had agreed
with the owner of the building to
use in its construction."
In Given v. The Bethlehem
Church, 'I W. N. C., 371, the Court
of Common Pleas No. 4, Philadel-
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phia County, in an opinion by ELCOCK, J., held that where a subcontractor had gone on the bond of
indemnity of the principal contractor to the owner against all
claims and liens for work and labor
done and materials furnished, he
could not himself file a lien ; to
this extent the opinion goes, although the decision was only that
there had been error in the rejection of the bond when offered in
evidence; and the opinion also
says that a breach of the condition
of the bond would be a set-off and
good defence to the sci.fa. on the
lien.
Attention is called to the language
of TILGHMAN, C. 3., in the case of
Hinchman v. Graham, 2 S. & R.,
169, where he decided that lumber
furnished for a building, but delivered at the carpenter shop, at a distance from it, and not used in it,
gave a lien. "I was once inclined
to think that the lien might be restrained to the materials aclually
used in the building. But, on reflecti ,n, I find that such a construction is not warranted by the words
of the law, and would operate unjustly on those who furnished the
materials; for how can they tell
the exact quantity that the building
will require, or what control have
they over the purchaser after delivery ?"
In the opinion in Haley v. Prosser, supra, the Court said: "The
object originally, in the contemplation of the Legislature, was to secure those who furnished labor or
materials to a mere builder, with.
out knowing the owner, or having
the opportunity to secure themselves."
It has been decided, under the
Act of 1845 above quoted, that one
who does not contract directly with

the owner must furnish the particulars as to the nature or kind of
the work done, and the kind and
amount of materials furnished, as
required by the 12th Section of the
Act of 1836, supra; although one
contracting directly with the owner
need not give these particulars
when the claim is filed on a special
contract under the Act of 1845:
Russell v. Bell, 44 Pa. St., 47; Lee
v. Burke, 66 Pa. St., 336. A like
decision was rendered in Gray v.
Dick, 97 Pa. St., 142. in regard to
the similar act of March 24, 1849,
P. L., 675.
Such was the current of decision
when the case of Schroeder v. Galland, 134 Pa. St., 277, came before
the Supreme Court in 189o. In this
case the plaintiff was a sub-contractor under Olmsted, the general
contractor. In the written contract
between Olmsted and the husband
of the owner, made with her consent, Olmsted agreed that he would
erect :'and deliver over to the party
of the first part, free of all liens
and encumbrances, or any claims
whatever that might arise under
any action of the party of the second part, or his legal representatives, under this contract, a basement, two-story and steep-roof residence," etc. The contract contained also the following stipulations: "These payments (on the
estimates of the architect), by the
party of the first part, are to be
made to the party of the second
part, provided the wages of all artisans and laborers, and all those
employed by or furnishing materials to the said party of the second
part, on account of this contract,
shall have been paid and satisfied;
the party of the second part hereby
agreeing to furnish such evidence
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of payment and satisfaction if required so to do, by the party of the
first part, prior to each payment_
. In case the party of the
.
second part fails to pay and satisfy
all and every legal claim and demand as aforesaid against the
building, the said party of the
first part may, if he deems proper
so to do, retain from the moneys
due, if any, to the party of the seeond part, enough to satisfy such
claims and demands, and if there
be not enough due or coming, then
the said second party covenants and
agrees to pay the same. Said second party also agrees to pay subcontractors and parties furnishing
materials on account of this contract, pro rata,at each estimate."
The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a lien.
In the opinion, GREEN, 3., said:
"A sub-contractor for construction
is certainly bound to know the kind
of building that is to be erected,
the materials of which it is to be
built, the price to be paid for it,
and the manner and times of payment. He cannot, under a contract for the erection of a building
at a cost of$i,ooo, furnish work and
materials to the amount of $5,ooo.
He cannot furnish wood as material for the erection of a building to
be built of marble, or stone, or
bricks. Nor can he furnish unsuitable materials, even of a kind demanded bythe contract, and entitle
himself to a lien therefor.
"Of course, it cannot be questioned for a moment that a subcontractor who undertakes the construction, in whole or in part, of a
building, under a contract with the
principal contractor, is absolutely
bound by all the plans and specifications expressed in the original
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contract of the owner with the
builder. He must conform to the
original contract in all matters and
in the minutest detail, precisely as
the builder would be obliged to do.
It is most obvious that he cannot
depart, in any respect, either from
the. designs, the dimensions, the
materials, the plans, shapes and
sizes that are expressed in the original contract; and the reason is
most manifest: He is the representative of the builder. He undertakes to perform the contract of the
latter with the owner, either in
whole or in part, and of course he
must conform to that contract in
every particular."
"There is no hardship to subcontractors in enforcing a provision
prohibiting liens against them, because they are bound to know, by
necessity, all the terms of the contract made by their principal in any
event, and they therefore know of
But the owner
the prohibition.
has no opportunity of protecting
himself, because he cannot know
to what persons the contract, or
portions of it, may be sub-let. He
has done all he could do by prohibiting liens, in plain terms, in his
written contract; and of that prohibition all sub-contractors are
bound to know, and may abstain
from contracting on such terms if
they choose. We know of no good
reason for giving such an extraordinary privilege to sub-contractors
as the right to repudiate one of the
most important terms to which
their contracts are subject, or of
taking away from an owner the
right to insist upon the performance
of his contract according to its literal terms. We take away houses
and lands from their owners by
means of some secret lien or trust
of which they know nothing, by
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applying the doctrine of construct- first part will not at any time suffer
ive notice; and it would be passing
or permit any lien, attachment or
strange for us to hold that the right
other encumbrance, under any law
of a sub-contractor for .part of a
of this State or otherwise, by any
building is of so sacred a character
person or persons whatsoever, tV
that it shall not be bound b6y the be put or remain upon the building
express limitations of awritten conor premises into or upon which any
tract, under which, and by force of work is -done or materials are furwhich, his own contract must be nished under this contract, for such
performed. His right of lien has work and materials, or by reason
no existence at common law or in of any other claim or demand
equity. It is a creature of statute against-the party of the first part;
alone ; but the statute confers upon
and that any such lien, attachment
him no special prerogative to tran- or other encumbrance, until it is
scend the most familiar principles
removed, shall preclude any and all
of the law, and to claim privileges
claim and demand for any payment
which are denied to all other citi- whatsoever under or by virtue of
zens in the determinatia of their
this contract. . .
"And further, the last instalcontract rights. Let it be granted
that a contractor, as well as the ment shall not be payable, unless,
owner, has power to bind the build- in addition to the architect's cering by a lien for work and mate- tificate, a fal release of all claims
and liens againat the said building
rials; we have never yet held that
and its appurtenances and the said
he may confer that right upon a
mere sub-contractor under him lot of ground, for all work done and
when, by the terms of his own con- all materials furnaihed in or about
tract, he does not possess the right the, construction and erection of
said building, has beei delivered
himself. The question is one of
first impression. Heretofore it has by the party of the first part, aud
unless the architect shall certify
never been before us. It is with
that all damages or allowances
us now, and we are at, liberty to
which should be paid or made by
decide it in accordance with our
the party of the first part have been
views of right and justice, and with
deducted from the said instalment,
those principles of the interpretation and administration of contracts
and also a certificate fromthe party
between citizens which we unfail- of the irst part att all claims and
demands for extra work or otheringly apply in all other cases."
wise under or in connection with
The following cases have been
held to be within the rule laid down
this contract have been presented
to the architect . . .
in Schroeder v. Galland:
"The payment'shall be made by
Benedict v. Hood, 134 Pa. St.,
the party of the second part in
289.. While this case might have
been wholly rested upon the decis- instalments, when, and in the
ion in Scheid v. Rapp, sufpra, the amounts approved by the archiCourt expressly put it upon the tect: Provided, That no instalcase of Schroeder v. Galland. -Here ment shall be less than three hunthe material clauses of the agree- dred dollars, and that g margin of
ment were as follows: "And it is twenty per cent. shall always refurther agreed that the party of the main for the final instalment; that
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is, there shall at all times be at least
works; or for injury to any person
twenty per cent. of the work done . or persons, either, workmen or the
which is unpaid for. And the'sub- public, or for damages to adjoining
contractors, mechanics'and mate- property." .
4al-men, except thosetwho have
Tebay & Klingensmith v. Kilexecuted the bond of Joseph C.
patrick & Company, Limited, i
Pharoh, as sureties for this contract,
Adv. Rep., 66. Here the contract
shall first give a release of lien for
between the owner and principal
all work done and material supplied
contractor provided that the conby them up to date of such paytractor should "not sub-let the
ment."
work, or any part thereof, %ithout
Dersheimer v. Maloney, 143 Pa.
consent in writing of the proprieSt, 532. This was a lien filed by a
tors," or- owners; and also that
sub-contractor. The coitiact besaid owners should "not in any
tween the owner and the principal
manner be answerable or accountcontractor contained the following
able for . . . any of the materials
piovisons:
or other things used and employed
"(2) . . . Eighty-five per cent.
in finishing and completing said
will be paid aA the wrk-'progresses
works."
on labor and 'materials, in monthly
Wilkinson v. Brice, i Adv. Rep.,
payments, according to and upon
Here the agreement con481.
the estimate of the architect. The tained a clause identical in lanproprietor reserves the right to pay
guage with that, first quoted from
bills, deducting fifteen per cent. Benedict v. Hood, supra.
. Bolton v. Hey, x Adv. Rep.,
until completion: Provided, That
in each, case of payment a certifi6o8. In this case paragraph IX
cate shall be obtained from the
of the contract provided for payprovided ment to the contractor upon the
.and,
architect ; ....
further,That in each case a certificertificate of the architect "and
cate shall be obtained by the conupon sufficient evidence that all
tractor from the clerk of the office
claims upon the buildingfor workor
where liens are recorded, signed
material up to the time of each and
and sealed by the clerk, that he has every payment are discharged, or if
'carefully examined the records and
the party of the first part shall refinds no liens or claims recorded
quire it, either a full or partial reagainst said -work; neither shall
lease, at the option of and satisfacthere be any legal or lawful claims
tory to the said party ofthe first part,
against the contractor in any man- of all liens against said premises on
ner, from any source whatever, for
the part of all persons, if any, who,
work or materials furnished on said up to that time, have delivered
works."
materials for use in, or performed
"(7) The proprietori will nOt, in work upon, the said building, and
any manner, be answerable or ac- before the final[ payment hereafter
countable for loss or damage that
specified shall become due, to furshall or may happen to said work
nish to the said party of the first
or any part or parts thereof respec.
part, a full, complete and perfect
release of all liens which may lie
tively, or for any of the materials
against the building or premises on
or other things used and employed
account of work done or materials
in finishing and completing 'said
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furnished thereto, including the
liens of the said party of the second
part."
A supplemental agreement, also
in writing and executed at the same
time, provided:
"It is further agreed that the
said building shall be built, finished and delivered over to the
party of the first part free of all
liens and encumbrances, or any
claims whatever that might arise
under any action of the party of the
second part, or his legal representatives under this contract, and that
the provisions of the ninth section
of said contract shall not be taken
to subject the said building to any
liability for the payment for labor
or materials furnished in and about
the erection thereof, or the said
party of the first part to any liability therefor, other than the payment of the contract price to the
said party of the second part as
therein provided."
Besides the principal case, the
following cases have been held not
to be within the rule of Schroeder
and Galland. Murphy v. Morton,
139 Pa., 345, where the contract
was: "'The said party of the second
part . . . . will deliver the said
houses, so completed, to the party
of the first part, free, clear and discharged of and from all claims,
liens of mechanics and materialmen, and from any and all charges
whatsoever; and, to insure on his
part the performance of this part
of the contract, the party of the
second part hereby agrees to furnish to the owner, at each payment
after the first payment, satisfactory
receipts, showing that the proceeds
of all preceding payments have
been devoted exclusively to paying
for materials and workmanship used
in the construction of the said pair
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of houses; and, before the last or
final payment shall be due or payable, the party of the second part
shall furnish the party of the first
part with releases from sub-contractors and material-men, and
from any and all persons having a
right of lien or action against the
said houses, or the property on
which they are located, for any
work or materials furnished and
used in their construction."
Loyd & Company v. Xrause &
Sons, I Adv. Rep., 240. Here the
contract contained the following
clause : "Neither shall there be any
legal or lawful claims against the
party of the first part (the general
contractor) in any manner, from
any source whatever, for work or
materials furnished on said work."
In the preceding part of the same
section of the contract, there was a
provision that the last payment of
the contract price need got be made
until "'acomplete release of liens
shall have been furnished by the
party of the first part."
Willey v. Topping, i Adv. Rep.,
241. Here the contractor, subsequent to his contract, but before
the sub-contractor furnished the
material for which he claimed a
lien, had released his right to file
a lien.
It is respectfully submitted that
these cases are not reconcilable with
each other. Take the leading case
on each side, Shroeder v. Galland
and Murphy v. Morton; what essential diflerence is' there in the
language of the contracts?
It will be noticed that the doctrine of Shroeder v. Galland is
largely built upon the theory that
the sub-contractor is presumed to
know all the details of the contract
between the owner and the general
contractor, and is bound by all the
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356, are cited in Schroeder v. Galterms of that contract. In the
land as deciding "that the right of
principal case, while the facts are
stated not to bring it within Schroe- the sub-contractor to a lien is controlled by the terms of the original
der and Galland, yet the doctrine
contract, and he is presumed to
of Schroeder and Galland is exhave notice of the terms of that
pressly recognized and affirmed;
These decisions were
contract."
but in the last paragraph but one
both made under the California
of the opinion the reasoning on
Act of April 26, 1862, P. L., 384,
which Schroeder and Galland is
based is departed from. The Court which Act, in its first section, provides that the lien given under it
no longer says that the sub-conshall only be "to the extent of the
tractor "is absolutely bound by all
original contract price;" and, in
the plans and specifications exSection 5, that "whenever, by the
pressed in the original contract of
provisions of the original contract,
the owner with the builder. He
the payments to an original conmust conform with the original
tractor are to be made by instalcontract in all matters and in the
ments," those claiming a lien must
minutest detail, precisely as the
give notice to the owner before the
builder would be obliged to do. It
is most obvious that he cannot de- instalment becomes due to entitle
them to any payment out of it; and,
piart in any respect either from the
under Section io, the owner cannot
designs, the dimensions, the mateanticipate any payment to the
rials, the plans, shapes and sizes
prejudice of the lien claimants.
that are expressed in the original
The point decided in Shaver v.
contract." The Court now says,
Alurdock was that the owner could
"lHe can know, and he must take
notice, as we have seen, of the title not vary his original agreement
of the apparent owner, and of the -with his contractor so as to affect
the interests of a material-man,
general characterof the agreement
under which the contractor is pro- without timely notice to the material-man. Henley z. Wadsworth
ceeding to build. He can know,
and must take notice of, thegen- decided that the owner who paid
his contractor by instalments, in
eral chanzcter of the building, and
accordance. with the contract beof the materials and labor proper
tween them, and without any notice
to be used in its construction. He
from lien claimants, was, under the
must see to it that the materials he
Act, protected in so doing. It is
supplies are such as may be reasonably needed for and used about such evident that neither of these cases
support the decision in Schroeder
a building, both as to their quantity
v. Galland.
and quality, but here his responsiBut in Bowen v. Aubrey, 22 Cal.,
bility ends. Subject to these quali566, it is distinctly ruled that a subfications and conditions he may
contractor cannot claim a right of
bind the building for what his malien where such right has been
terials or labor may be reasonably
waived by the original contractor.
worth." This sounds like a return
CROCKIR, J., on page 570, says:
to Odd Fellows' Hall v. Masser,
"When an owner of property has
sitfira.
contracted with another to erect a
Shaver v. Murdock, 36 Cal., 298,
building, or other superstructure, or
and Henley v. Wadsworth, 38 Cal.,
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do any other work, or furnish ma- restoring the law to what it had
terials therefor, all sub-contractors
been supposed to be before the deand parties agreeing to furnish
cision in Schroeder v. Galland.
labor or materials to such original
The two sections, of which this
contractor do so with reference to
Act consists, are as follows:
such original contract, in subordi"Section i. Be it enacted, etc.
nation to its provisions and to the That no contract which shall hererights of the respective parties after be made for the erection of
thereto, so far as they relate to the the whole or any part of a new
liability of the owner or the prop- building with the owner of the lot
erty, or so far as they rely on such
on which the same shall be erected,
liability; and any agreement such shall operate to interfere with or to
parties may make with such origidefeat the right of a sub-contractor
nal contractor is, so far as relates who shall do work or shall furnish
to the owner or the property, sub- materials under agreement with the
ject to 11 the terms, agreements, 'original contractor in aid of such
conditions and stipulations of such erection, to file a mechanics' lien
original contract; and the owner
for the amount which shall be due
or the property cannot be held for the value of such work or maliable or bound to any extent be- terials furnished, unless such subyond the terms of the original concontractor shall have consented in
tract, or such new or further conwriting to be bound by the provitract as he may make with the sions of such contract, with the
original contractor or the sub-conowner, in regard to the filing of
tractors."
liens.. Without such written conThis case was decided under the sent of the sub-contractor all conCalifornia Acts of April I9, 1856,
tracts between the original contracand April 22, 1858, which, like the tor and the owner, which shall
subsequent Act of 1862, seem to
expressly or impliedly stipulate
contemplate that the owner can
that no such lien shall be filed,
only be called upon to pay the un- shall be invalid as against the right
paid balance of his contract price,
of such sub-contractor to file the
and that the sub-contractor must
same.
know what this is and tile terms of
"Section 2. All persons contractpayment See Phillips on Mech.
ing with the owner of ground for
Liens, 272.
the erection or construction of the
See also Henry v. Rice, I8 Mo.,
whole 6r any part of a new building
App., 497 (overruled in Henry &
thereon, shall be deemed the agent
Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo.,
of such owner in ordering work or
47); Shaw v. Stewart, 43 Kan., 572 ; materials in and about such erection
Bardwell v. Mann, 46 Minn., 285,
orconstruction,and any sub-contrac289.
tor doing such work or, furnishing
such materials shall be entitled to
The itatute which is undoubtedly
file a mechanics' lien for the value
referred to in the opinion in the
thereof within six months from the
principal case, and indicated theretime the said work was completed
in to be unconstitutional, is the by said sub-contractor, notwithAct of June 8, I89i, P. L., 225,
standing any stipulations to the
contrary in the contract between
which was passed with the idea of
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the owner and the contractor, unless such stipulation shall have been
consented to in writing by such
sub-contractor."
It is suggested by WirnLr.Ms, J.,
that this statute is within the prohibition of Article i, 17, of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania; and
that it might also be within the prohibition of Article i, to,of the Constitution of the United States. On
examining the sections of the Constitutions referred to, it is evident
that the only clause which could
have been in the mind of the Judge
is the one, in identical language in
both Constitutions, prohibiting the
State from passing any "law impairing the obligation of contracts."
But it needs but a moment's consideration of the Act in question to
see that it cannot be held unconstitutional on this ground, as the
Act, by its terms, is only applicable
to contracts made after its passage
and the inhibitions of the constitutions only protect contracts made
before the passage of the law which
seeks to impair them. See Lehigh
Water Company v. Easton, 121 U.
S., 388; Hare on Constitutional
Law, page 676.
The question then arises, is the
Act in question unconstitutional
on any other ground? It will here
be necessary to consider for a
moment the general nature of
mechanics' lien laws. They are
purely statutory. They have been
accepted as reasonable by the people, because they seem like little
more than an extension of the common law lien, which anyone has
who adds to the value of a chattel
in his possession by expending his
labor upon it. Legally their validity does not seem to have been
often called into question.
The
principle upon which, when at26

tacked, they have been supported
is well expressed by ChiefJustice
SHAw, in Donaghy v. Klapp, 12
Cush., 44o: "Before the year I85r,
no one could create such a lien bya
building contract, except the owner
or person having an interest therein, to the extent of such interest.
But by that statute one who had
contracted with the owner to erect
a building had. power, by his subcontract with another for the whole
or part of the work, to create a similar lien on the estate in favor of
such sub-contractor. . . . Before that statute took effect as law,
the contract gave a lien to Hilt (the
original contractor) only, which
was the act of the owner charging
his own estate. But under the operation of that statute, a precisely
similar contract by the owner of
land would give the contractor a
power to bind the estate by other
liens in favor of sub contractors for
labor thereon. Such liens in favor
of such sub-contractors, would
equally bind the estate by consent
of the owner; because such a contract, by force of the existing law,
when it was made, of which the
owner is presumed to be conusant,
gives his irrevocable power to his
contractor to charge and bind his
estate; and when such power is
executed by the actual making of
such sub-contract for labor, it is in
law the act of the owner hypothecating his own estate to the extent
of the price of such labor." See
also Phillips on Miechanics' Liens,.
.65, and Laird v.Moonan, 32 Minn.,
358. The contractor is made the
general agent of the owner, with
authority to bind, not the owner
personally, but the building, in favor of a sub-contractor, by a lien
for reasonable and suitable materials, although (in the absence of
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an express statutory provision) the
aggregate of the sub-contractors'
liens exceeds the contract price.
Such powers are, under the law, implied to have been given to the
contractor by the owner. But where
the owner in his contract has expressly stated that he gave the contractor no such powers, can the
Legislature declare that the contractor shall, nevertheless, as to subcontractors and material-men, be
held to -have *such powers? And
this, even wherr the sub-contractor
has actual notice and full knowledge of this provision in the cobtract between the owner aid the
original contractor; for, in the statute in question, the only way in
which the sub-contractor can be
held by such a provision in the
original contract is by his consent
thereto in writing.
The constitutional provisions under which this Act will most probably be attacked, are the clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
provides that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law;" and
the First Section of the First Article
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
which classes among the inherent
and indefeasible rights of all men,.
that "of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property." Certainly it
may be argued with considerable
force that the effect of this Act will
be to limit the owner's enjoyment
of real estate; and to put it out of
his power to make the ordinary and
useful improvements to his property
without subjecting himself to the
risk of having it burdened with
debts which he did not personally
contract, for improvements for
which he has fully paid, and which
debts were made a lien upon the

property by the acts of one to whom
he had expressly refused to give any
power to pledge the property for the

payment of these debts, and of
which refusal the persons to whom
the debts are owing had full knowledge when they contracted them.
This seems like carrying the doctrine of implied agency beyond all
pr6per limits.
But why invoke the doctrine of
agency at all? Cannot the Legislature say that every building erected
with the authority of the landowner
shall be subject to a Hen for work
and-materials in favor of those who
furnish them, which lien they alone
can waive? "As soon as owners
of lots ceased to be their own
builders, they put it in the power

of the persons employed by them
to occasion losses to mechanics and
material-men which they ought not
to bear; and it was to remedy this
mischief that the Legislature established the principle that materials
and labor are to be considered as
having been furnished on the credit
of the building, and not of the contractor. The principle is not only
a just but a convenient one.
Whether the builder be the agent
of the owner or an indePendent
contrador, his appointment to the
job -creates a confidence in him'
which was not h ad before; and the
consequences of a false confidence
ought not to be borne by those who
had no hand in occasioning it."
GIBsON, C. J., in White v. Miller,
i8 Pa. St., 52. This case is well
worth careful reading.
Probably the Act would be free
from objection if it had provided
that the lien in' favor of the subcontractor should not exist where
the original contract stipulated
against such liens and was filed or
recorded in some public office. See

